Mr. J. Edgar Hoover Director Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Justice Washington. D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

As you will recall, the National Security Council desires to ensure close coordination between foreign and domestic intelligence. The prerequisite to close coordination between these two fields is an exchange of information between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. I have instructed all elements of this Agency to disseminate to the Bureau items of information which become available to them, that appear to have application to your function. I shall be most appreciative if you will reciprocate. I recognize, of course, the security precautions that will have to be observed by this Agency in utilizing any information you may supply, and I am sure that I can count on your cooperation in making this essential contribution to the national security.

As an example of the type of information available to the FBI, which is of importance to the production of intelligence bearing on the national security, I cite the case of Dr. Fuchs. This Agency is responsible for making periodic estimates of the progress of the USSR in designing, producing, and stock-piling atomic bombs. The information available to this Agency at the time the last periodic estimate was being written indicated that the Soviets could not have produced their first bomb prior to a certain future date. Recently information has been furnished to the public about Dr. Fuchs which indicates that the Soviet espionage effort had been successful to a certain degree in obtaining information that has enhanced Soviet capabilities in the design and production of atomic bombs. Had this information been available to the Central Intelligence Agency, our computation of the time by which the Soviets could have obtained their first bomb would have been appreciably advanced, because allowance would have been made for successful espionage. In truth,

the information would have had a great affect on the substance of our estimate, due to the paucity of information from other sources. This is an example of how counter-espionage information can be most useful in having a positive intelligence value to this Agency. I have no doubt that you will agree with me that the lack of a free flow to CIA of such information has most serious implications to the national security.

I urge that in the future your Eureau furnish this Agency with all information which would be useful to the production of intelligence bearing on the national security as soon as it becomes available to you. I assure you that I will take all possible precautions to insure that any items of information that you may furnish through our existing channels or otherwise are adequately safeguarded.

Sincerely,

R. H. HILLENKOETTER Rear Admiral, UEN Director of Central Intelligence

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